wounds of this war through its Truth and Reconciliation Commission is one of the most ambitious examples to date of integrating not only a human security perspective, but a gendered human security perspective into transitional and transformative justice.²

The concept of human security was first introduced to an international audience in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, which defined human security as "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression" and "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (UNDP 1994, 23). Human security seeks to complement, or in some cases challenge, the traditional notion of security as interstate conflict and defense of territory. Instead, human security is focused on people's well-being, which is expressed as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (Commission on Human Security 2003, iv). Rather than armaments, development is the key tool advocated for the defense of human security. Human security is broad: it encompasses economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security (UNDP 1994, 24–25). The concept is also explicitly linked with violence, a fact illustrated quite starkly in Peru's civil conflict (Gibson and Reardon 2007, 55; UNDP 1994, 23). However, insecurity and poverty do not explain conflict by themselves; ideology and organization also play important roles (Foran and Goodwin 1993; Selbin 1993; Wierocks 1991).

The concept of human security has been critiqued on many levels: for being so broad that it becomes meaningless; for reinforcing the central role of the state in providing security when the concept has been applied; and for lacking a clear focus on gender and insecurity (Paris 2001; Hudson 2005; Gibson and Reardon 2007; Hoogensen and Stuvey 2006).³ Yet the concept has also opened the way for gender to be included in the conceptualization of security to a greater degree than before (Hudson 2010, 29) and a gender-informed approach to human security can be illuminating; through the feminist practice of making room for the marginalized, nonstate actors may inform our understandings of security in much fuller, more holistic, and ultimately more useful ways (Hoogensen and Stuvey 2006).

In this chapter we take a gender-informed approach to human security in our analysis of Peru's civil war in order to highlight the multiplicity of insecurities at stake in that conflict, insecurities that especially
affected those subordinated by the crosscutting inequalities of gender and race. Further, we describe the work of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. We argue that Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission put into practice not just a human security perspective, but a gendered human security perspective to transitional justice by creating “a discursive space where the structurally excluded actor can speak” (Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006, 224). The recommendations of the Commission have yet to be carried out; the country remains in a conflicted and complex transition in which wounds are still open, the progression toward making amends is modest, and the fight for memory is fierce. But the Commission was a model in its recognition of the deep connections between the everyday insecurities at the heart of the human security concept and the violence of war. By exposing these insecurities in their multiplicity of dimensions through the voices of the victims themselves, the Commission sought not just to heal the wounds opened by the conflict, but also to address its underlying causes.

We begin by providing a brief background on the Peruvian conflict and its roots in human insecurity. We then focus on Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, highlighting its attention to gender, race, and human security in Peru’s conflict and its practice of giving voice to the marginalized. We end with some reflections on the gendered human security challenges Peru still faces, in spite of the efforts and advances made by the Commission.

The Conflict with the Shining Path

Most guerrilla insurgencies have historically risen against authoritarian governments, but Peru’s insurgency made itself known at the point of that country’s transition to democracy. In 1980, as Peru held elections after over a decade of military rule and the first elections in which illiterates could vote, Shining Path militants burned ballots in the Andean village of Chuschi as an announcement of war for the Peruvian state. The Shining Path was one of two guerrilla groups to challenge Peru’s government in the 1980s and 1990s, but compared to its rival revolutionary group, the urban-based Revolutionary Tupac Amaru Movement, the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (known simply as the Shining Path) was by far more deadly.

Lack of human security—namely, poverty and inequality that are highly correlated with racial hierarchies in Peru—was a precondition for the growth of the Shining Path. Although led by Abimael Guzmán, a university professor from the provincial University of Huamanga in the highland department of Ayacucho, and a small entourage of elite members from the urban middle-class, the Shining Path recruited mainly first-generation college students of poor peasant families attending this university. Many of these recruits were attracted to the message of revolution, especially as they found no opportunities for upward mobility, despite their education, in Peru’s hierarchical society in which white and mixed race (mestizo) elite residents of coastal cities, and especially the capital, Lima, have traditionally maintained political and economic power (de Wit and Gianotten 1994; Degregori 2012). The relationship between human insecurity and the violence incited by the Shining Path is also evident in the fact that it claimed its strongest footholds in the poorest provinces. In the southern highlands, where the Shining Path was strongest, caloric intake in 1980 was below 70 percent of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization minimum requirements, and in some areas of Ayacucho, consumption was less than 420 calories a day. Already poor agricultural productivity rates were seriously challenged by drought in 1983. Illiteracy rates and access to potable water had improved since the 1970s, but they remained high. In Ayacucho, 45 percent of the population was illiterate in 1980 and 85 percent did not have access to potable water (McClintock 2001, 68–69).

While human insecurity lay at the root of Peru’s violence, the Shining Path ideology incited a particularly gruesome form. Guzmán, also known as “President Gonzalo,” cultivated his cultlike following with a rigid ideology that mixed Maoism, Marxism, Leninism, and the writings of Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariategui. A central characteristic of the Shining Path was dedication to violence, using violence against the “masses” as well as the state in its millenarian quest for power (DeGregori 1994, 2012; Starn 1995). Guzmán glorified violence, viewing it as a strategy by which the process of destroying the old order and building a new one could be accelerated (Portocarrero 1998, 21–22). Adherents had to pledge their willingness to die for the cause. Many of the college students recruited into the Shining Path became teachers in their home communities, bringing not only reading, writing, and math,
but also the ideological message of the Shining Path home with them (McClintock 2001, 78; de Wit and Gianotten 1994).

The Shining Path gained a foothold in southern rural villages in part by filling a power vacuum and becoming the new “patrón” in communities that had just experienced land reform and the flight of provincial elites (DeGregori 1994; McClintock 2001, 72–73). Traditionally, the patrón was the masculine hacienda (large estate) owner who exercised economic, social, and even sexual control over the peasants that worked the land. According to testimonies collected by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Shining Path was considered a new patrón by local residents. The patrón, Neira and Ruiz Bravo argue, is an apt metaphor, in that it signals a “dominant (hegemonic) masculinity,” and a “principle of order.” The patrón not only exploits, but also “governs the people” as a racially superior, elite figure (2001, 216). In their study of rural areas of Peru, Neira and Ruiz Bravo found that the hegemonic masculine figure of the patrón continued to have resonance even after the haciendas had disappeared (211–231). The Shining Path, as the new, “unjust patrón” proposed a new order of violence and submission and inscribed a complex hierarchy based on class, race, and gender distinctions. The new order of the Shining Path challenged not just the state, but local authority structures, and even the family. Some families were required to move with the Shining Path to their revolutionary “retreats” where children were separated from their parents and sent to Shining Path schools and adolescents were forced into “sexual unions.” Graduating youth became lookouts and eventually part of the “Fuerza Local” or local Shining Path military forces.

The Shining Path proposed not only a political project, but a “moral” one with respect to sexuality and the family (Henríquez Ayín 2006). Testimonies of young people recruited by the Shining Path refer to the “law of subversion,” and a guidebook that contained eight edicts, among them “do not touch the women.” Despite these, a significant double discourse was evident. In Maoist philosophy, women are a fundamental pillar of armed revolution, and thus the Shining Path actively recruited women—requiring of them, as with others, their unconditional loyalty (Kirk 1993). Women were thought to compose 40 percent of Shining Path militants and 50 percent of its central command (Barrig 1993). But the Shining Path was far from feminist for the Shining Path, “Women only can organize themselves correctly through the classist principle of grouping women by their class position.” Unlike their male peers, however, the Shining Path also required their bodily as well as mental submission, as mistresses to male leaders. One mother declared, in opposition to militants taking her daughter: “You are making the girls enter so you can have them as your mistresses” (Del Pino 1999, 181). And while the Shining Path recruited women, it also actively reproduced patriarchal hierarchies, for example by using gender stereotypes to characterize its opponents, calling them “fags” (maricones) and “little women” (mujercitas) (Coral Cordero 1998, 349).

The Peruvian military responded indiscriminately to the growing power of the Shining Path in Peru’s countryside, committing murders and abuses irrespective of individuals’ true political affiliations. The indigenous Andean peasant became the enemy of the state and at the same time subject to possible annihilation by the Shining Path for non-compliance with its revolutionary project. The history of marginalization of Peru’s indigenous population made this abuse easier, as it fed on stereotypes of the indigenous peoples’ “uncivilized” nature. After making little headway with military offensives, the government supported and expanded local peasant self-defense militias (rondas campesinas) that were initially organized independently in some rural communities as a means of self-defense against the Shining Path (DeGregori et al. 1996; Starn 1999). Thus, three actors became the primary aggressors in this war: Shining Path militants, the state, and the self-defense militias.

Although based in the countryside, throughout the armed conflict the Shining Path also carried out attacks on cities, cutting electricity and calling for armed strikes. Eventually it made its way to Peru’s capital, intensifying its presence in Lima from 1986 forward. It infiltrated and terrorized the poor residents of the sprawling shantytowns that surround Lima, inhabited largely by those fleeing war and poverty in the countryside. There, it threatened local grassroots leaders, in particular women leaders who ran communal kitchens and Perú’s government-supported “Glass of Milk” program that recruits local mothers to distribute milk rations to poor children. The Shining Path’s murder of Maria Elena Moyano, an Afro-Peruvian leftist and feminist neighborhood leader in the poor neighborhood of Villa El Salvador on the outskirts of Lima, was one of the its most publicized violent acts.
Exposing Gendered and Racialized Violence

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was mandated by interim President Valentín Paniagua in 2001 and its final report was delivered in August 2003. Peru’s Commission had a number of notable characteristics. First, unlike many other commissions which only seek truth, the mandate of Peru’s TRC was to seek truth and promote reconciliation. The meaning of “reconciliation” has been a subject of fierce debate and political negotiation, but in practice it has meant giving voice to victims, providing reparations, and preserving memories of the conflict in an effort to both honor the victims and prevent the repetition of violence. The Commission’s work brought to light not only the violent acts perpetrated in the war, but also how these were connected to broader issues of human security, such as poverty, inequality, and racism. Peru’s Commission shared with the South African and Guatemalan truth commissions an objective of “gender sensitivity,” and it was the only one of these commissions to include a chapter on gender in its final report. But more than placing women on the agenda of the Truth Commission, the mode by which it carried out its work integrated a gender perspective by listening to the voices of the most marginalized who prior to this moment had never had a voice in the broader Peruvian society.

While we commend the work of the Commission, we are not uncritical. For example, the inclusion of sexual and gender-based violence was an afterthought; gender experts were invited to serve only after the Commission was formed and initially no budget was allocated for their work (Mantilla Falcon 2008a). Despite these disadvantages, these experts brought to light the gender dimension of the conflict, which may have remained buried had it not been for their persistent research. Their work was also exemplary in bringing to light the way gender and race worked together in the war context. The TRC uncovered gender-based violence at two primary levels: sexual violence and the more quotidian but still highly gendered and life-threatening threats that war presents to mere survival. We draw on the TRC Final Report (CVR 2003) in the sections that follow, to discuss the gendered dimensions of Peru’s civil war.

Sexual Violence

Building on advances in international law on the relationship between sexual violence and war, the Peruvian TRC adopted a broad definition of sexual violence that allowed it to include rape, forced marriage, forced abortions, forced nudity, sexual blackmail, and sexual slavery among other abuses in its investigation (Mantilla Falcon 2008b, 225). Sexual violence, especially in a war context, is not about individual victims and perpetrators, instead it is part of a process of subjugation—feminizing and racializing the opponent to provoke submission and to legitimize further violence by creating a dehumanized, feminine, and racialized “other.” Women often become sexual targets because they are seen as the “wombs” of the nation, making their violation powerfully symbolic (Enloe 1989, 42–64). At other times women are viewed as mere sexual objects, an opportunity for the pleasure and sexual relief of the combatants (Enloe 2000). When men are targeted with sexual violence, it is a means to “feminize,” as well as dehumanize them.

Sexual violence was a generalized, widespread practice in Peru’s civil war. The TRC found that sexual violence took place in at least fifteen of Peru’s twenty-four departments, in distant villages, and in urban state detention centers, perpetrated by all three participating actors (agents from the Shining Path, the state, and the self-defense militias). State agents were responsible primarily for rape (63 percent of all rapes), of which the overwhelming majority of victims were women (CVR 2003, 15, 273, 277). With respect to the Shining Path, testimonies to the Truth Commission pointed principally to the sexual mutilation of men and
women, forced sexual unions, and forced abortion—but rape as well, to some extent. The cases of documented sexual violence underrepresent the reality: victims felt shame in coming forward with testimonies of sexual violence. Moreover, such violence often occurred in the context of other human rights violations—such as massacres and torture—making victims of sexual violence feel as though their experience was negligible by comparison (Mantilla Falcon 2008b, 226; CVR 2003, 1.5, 275).

In Peru’s war, as in other wars, sexual violence became a form of torture and rape a tactic endorsed by military superiors. In rural villages, military officers used sexual violence as part of public demonstrations to instill fear and forcible collaboration from community members. They used it on individuals to get information and to provoke admissions of terrorist collaboration. Rape and other forms of sexual violence were also common in the state prisons where suspected terrorists were detained; of 118 testimonies gathered by the Commission in the Chorrillos Women’s Prison, 30 testified that they had suffered rape, while another 66 had been victims of other forms of sexual violence. Altogether they made up 81 percent of those interviewed (CVR 2003, 1.5, 275).

Sexual violence in Peru’s war actively created race and gender hierarchies; hierarchies which appear with palpable harshness in the testimonies of sexual violence perpetrated by the military. The experience of Georgina Gamboa is illustrative of rural village women who confronted the army, and her story reached national prominence. At the age of sixteen, she was raped by members of the military, first in her house and then in a police station in Vilcashuaman, Ayacucho. In her testimony to the TRC she recounted her experience:

[T]hey hit me and then started to abuse me, rape me, they raped me all night. I screamed for help, they put a handkerchief in my mouth and when I would scream and ask for help they beat me. I was totally mistreated that night. That night seven raped me, seven military men—seven sinchis entered to rape me. One left, one came in, one left, one came in. (CVR 2003, 1.5, 308)

A former army member testified to witnessing the rape of a twenty-seven-year-old woman detainee, raped by “six or eight” officers who afterwards commented on the act saying, “[S]he was good, the chola was a puta madre [mother whore]” (CVR 2003, 1.5, 305). In another testimony, a soldier described the rape of a dead woman before her decapitation and disposal in a river: “[T]all, gringa, nice. But she was already bad, she no longer satisfied any use. The troops were raping her.”

The rapes and their associated commentary reveal a process in which gender and race are invoked; the act of raping a woman suspected of being a terrorist served to solidify the masculine superiority of the army and police members. In gang rapes, it was also a mechanism of creating a hypermasculine and hierarchal group unity among the officers and conscripts (Theidon 2007). At the same time, rape feminized and dehumanized the victim as well as the more generalized opponent. The comments of the military officers, noted above, also demonstrate the process of racialization involved. “Chola” is a pejorative term referring to indigenous peasant women who migrate to urban centers. For the detainee described as “chola,” the officers created a racialized caricature that “deserved” sexual abuse. The white, “gringa” woman, by contrast, is described as “nice,” but because she was a suspected terrorist she was “bad,” and deserving of rape even after her death. Despite some variation, the victims of sexual violence (and of the violence of the war more generally) were overwhelmingly indigenous. The TRC final report notes that the “great majority” of victims of sexual violence were illiterate or had only finished primary school and 75 percent were Quechua speakers; the profile of indigenous women in Peru (CVR 2003, 1.5, 275–276). By the same token, the great majority of military troops could be considered “cholas” as well, with rural indigenous roots.

Sexual violence was also bargained in Peru’s war. Often victims were given the option of trading one form of human security, their sexual autonomy and dignity, for other forms of human security, like life or family. In the prisons, some of these victims were promised freedom or visit with family members if they “agreed” to being raped (CVR 2003, 1.5, 341–342). The TRC report notes a common complaint of women would consent to rape in exchange for the protection of a relative from death, or to obtain information about missing loved ones. In the account of one woman from Hualla, “They raped me because I wouldn’t let them rape my daughter. That’s why my daughter says ‘To save me, they raped you,’ and that’s why I suffer alone” (Theidon 2007, 468). Because single women and widows
were those most often targeted, some women married, unwillingly, as a source of protection (Theidon 2007, 465).

While the Shining Path declared that sexual violence was unacceptable, the reality was different. Although the numbers of rapes committed by the Shining Path were far fewer than those committed by the state, they did occur. As one former member of the Shining Path testified to the TR: "They allowed us to rape a woman three times, but the fourth time there was no pardon, they buried you" (CVR 2003, 1.5, 283). But the types of sexual violence committed by the Shining Path was generally different, for example, keeping persons in positions of sexual slavery in Shining Path encampments or forcing "sexual unions" between Shining Path militants. Women and girls held by the Shining Path against their will were forced to cook and serve, and often were the objects of sexual abuse (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 43). Those held were young, usually under twenty years old (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 49). Whereas the army would rape prior to killing villagers, the Shining Path would mutilate genitals and other body parts of men and women prior to a massacre (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 60).

Whether perpetrated by the state, the Shining Path, or the peasant militias, the violence of rape extended far beyond the act itself. Some women were abandoned by their husbands when they discovered they had been raped, as happened to the woman from Huallpa who was quoted above. Other women committed suicide upon the realization that they were pregnant with the child of a soldier or terrorist. Some, alternatively, maintained that the rapist was their partner, clinging to some legitimacy for themselves and the child. Many women were unable to register the children upon their birth, because the father's name was unknown, a situation which perpetuated a cycle of marginalization by effectively denying citizenship to these children.

Quotidian Gendered Violence of War

The TRC did not limit its investigation of "gender" to sexual violence. It also investigated the differential ways in which women and men were affected by the civil conflict beyond sexual violence due to the different roles that each played in the conflict and in Peruvian society, highlighting the gendered nature of human security in the war and its aftermath.

Men, for example, were 77 percent of those killed in the conflict, a number much greater than women (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 58). Among the women who were killed were those found in indiscriminate massacres as well as selective murders. The selective murders targeted those accused of aiding subversives or those who themselves were rebel leaders. In turn, as mentioned above, the Shining Path targeted the women in provincial capitals and in Lima who had organized forms of self-help. These women provided an alternative, peaceful means of dealing with the country's human security crisis and directly confronted the Shining Path in marches "for peace" in 1988 in Ayacucho and "against hunger and terror" in 1991 in Lima (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 52–53). They therefore posed a real threat to the Shining Path, which assassinated many of their leaders.

The fact that so many men were killed or disappeared left many women in the position of caring for family (and often farm or small business) alone. Many lamented not just the horrific loss of a partner, but also the quality of life that they could have had had their partner survived. Women had to take full responsibility for farming, for caring for livestock, and ultimately for ensuring that their families were fed. And the actions of the military officers sometimes targeted those very tasks, stealing livestock from villagers or raiding and destroying their stocks of grain. Of course these episodes hurt men and women alike, but women who had lost their partners struggled particularly hard. As one woman related in a testimony:

In my community we suffered a lot, I was left alone when the Shining Path entered into my community and my husband escaped to Lima because he was a local leader, they burned my house, and I stayed in my community to work like a man, alone, and now I don't feel well, I can't work for all the worries that I have.9

As the survivors, women were also those who searched for justice for their missing or killed loved ones. The search for justice itself often put these women in greater danger of human rights abuse, including sexual abuse (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 46). Because so many of these women were indigenous, monolingual Quechua speakers, their efforts were made all the more difficult by language barriers with state officials. Some of them
joined together in Ayacucho in 1983 to create the National Association of Relatives of the Kidnapped, Detained and Disappeared of Peru (Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú, ANFASEP) in which they pooled their efforts in the search for their loved ones and offered each other material and emotional support.

**Gendering Human Security: Bringing Voice to the Voiceless**

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission had great symbolic value in providing voice, visibility, and legitimacy to Quechua-, Añashinkara-, and Aymara-speaking indigenous Peruvian women who are located at the very bottom of Peru’s social hierarchy. At the same time, literate and urban Peruvians found themselves having to confront this community of oral tradition, which vividly depicted Peru’s tragic war to the nation. Wars and armed conflicts are usually presented as epic narratives about aggressive confrontations, even in Peru, where the conflict was unconventional. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for all its challenges, worked against this narrative by including the claims for justice of those usually omitted from these histories. This, in and of itself, was a process that Hoogensen and Stuuy (2006) call a gender-integrated approach to human security.

Of the 18,123 testimonies gathered by Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 54 percent were from women and 46 percent from men. The reasons for this gender imbalance are diverse: women survived the war in greater numbers, but in addition gender norms in Peru allow women greater public expression of grief than men (CVR 2003, chapter 2, 51). Among those who testified in public hearings, 75 percent were Quechua-speaking victims. Hearing from indigenous women also went against all the preexisting cultural codes: in Peru, the voices of indigenous people, and indigenous women especially, are usually ignored. They are also regularly the target of scorn and ridicule as a result of racist stereotypes. Even in their home villages, indigenous women rarely are granted a public voice as men almost exclusively dominate village governance. Thus, providing voice to indigenous women on a national level was truly a break from past social practices. Many of the testimonies were nationally televised as well as reported on in the press and in the Commission’s own reports. By giving voice to the most marginalized of Peru’s society, some have argued that the TRC has begun a process of deepening Peru’s democracy (LaPlante 2007). Many of those who testified, moreover, have become advocates for their communities vis-à-vis state authorities in the ongoing struggle to see the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission become reality.

**Continuing Challenges**

Despite the accomplishments of the TRC, the Commission and Peruvian society still face tremendous challenges in overcoming the legacy of Peru’s civil conflict and the inequalities at its root. Among these challenges we can point to a militarist culture, the very slow pace of achieving justice and awarding reparations, and societal polarization with regard to memory of the war. These challenges have been made more difficult because the promotion and protection of human rights have not been a priority of either the national or regional governments; while interim President Panagüa created the Commission, its work was carried out under subsequent presidents Alejandro Toledo and Alan García, both of whom were less supportive of the Commission’s work. Yet, there are also positive signs in Peru’s civil society of individuals and organizations working toward greater justice.

The conflict in Peru resulted in a process of militarization of Peruvian society, with important gendered effects. The war increased the importance of the military as an institution, and consequently its political influence as well. The military was a key political player behind the scenes, especially under the government of Alberto Fujimori. But the impact of the military went beyond its military might and political power to influence society. As with many societies that experience war, Peru’s conflict led to a “militarization” of society, in which military values became societal values. The process of societal militarization manipulates masculinities and femininities, creating gendered archetypes such as the woeful mother and the valiant soldier. Militarist constructions of gender create and reinforce rigid gender roles and can also serve as justification for rape or prostitution (Enloe 2000; Ruddick 1995; Tickner 1992). These gendered constructions were reinforced during Peru’s years of war and can be observed in the gendered violence
that we described in previous sections. The continuing militarization of Peruvian society is evident in direct and discursive ways. Directly, in areas of Peru where the Shining Path is still active (but now is mainly interested in drug trafficking), old practices continue, for example the abduction of young people by Shining Path militants to sustain their ranks. In turn, Shining Path activity has resulted in a continued presence of the military in these communities. On a more discursive level, the state has used fear of a return of terrorism as an instrument of control and as a way to gain legitimacy for authoritarian actions (Burt 2006). This discourse of fear had some ironic gendered aspects in the 2011 election campaign when the female candidate Keiko Fujimori used both the fear of a return to terrorism and the more peaceful trope of motherhood to advance her (ultimately failed) campaign (Ewig 2012).

The pace of implementation of the TRC's recommendations has been exceedingly slow. The TRC was mandated to collaborate with Peru's justice system in order to identify victims and perpetrators. Based on the findings of the TRC, prosecutions were then to have been carried out by the Peruvian justice system. There have been some very significant trials, such as the trial of former President Alberto Fujimori, who was convicted for his role in two massacres carried out by special military forces under his command. But the TRC itself has had challenges, like most truth commissions, in unearthing the kind of evidence necessary for convictions. It thus chose to pursue specific, high-profile cases which both fit the broader patterns of violence that it found, and for which it felt there was sufficient evidence (Ciurlizza and González 2006, 11-12). However, often when it handed over these cases to the Ministry of Public Prosecution, the ministry showed little willingness to prioritize TRC cases, and it has been extremely slow to act, resulting in a backlog that exists to this day (Ciurlizza and González 2006, 13). The slow pace of punishment has led to disappointment among those affected by the violence, many of whom mistakenly assumed the TRC itself had the power of a court to bring perpetrators to justice (Cano and Ninaquispe 2006, 43). Of the forty-seven cases handed over to the Ministry of Public Prosecution by the TRC, two were cases of sexual violence. These, like the other cases, have been acted on only slowly. They face difficulties of both finding evidence for the crimes due to the years that have passed, and of fear and resistance by the women themselves, who in some cases prefer not to prove that soldiers fathered their children, for fear of losing parental rights (Salazar Luzula 2006).

An important aspect of the TRC was to recommend reparations, something not all truth commissions have done. The TRC argued that the state had a responsibility to provide reparations for not having respected human rights and for not carrying out its responsibility to protect its citizens. Moreover, the Commission felt reparations were important for restoring trust in the state (CVR 2003, Vol. IX, 149). Reparations were conceived of broadly, including both symbolic and economic measures. In 2004, the government of Alejandro Toledo created a Commission (La Comisión Multisectoral de Alto Nivel) to distribute reparations, but this Commission was woefully understaffed and underfinanced, resulting in very little progress. The process of reparations was helped somewhat in 2005, when Congress passed Law 28592, which codified the reparations process into law, and which specified six types of reparations: restitution of citizen rights, housing assistance, and reparations relating to education and health as well as symbolic and collective reparations. But the law also had important flaws, such as specifically defining subversives as not “victims” (even if they had been victims of abuse), thus contradicting United Nations definitions of who constitutes a victim (Guillerot 2008, 12, 26). Under Alan García, the process improved only slightly. Municipalities established special health and education services directed at victims of violence, and the national Commission did deliver some collective reparations for communities or groups that were affected by violence, although in some cases this distribution was tarnished by clientelism. At other times, general government social services were called “repairs,” when in fact they were not specifically reparations (Guillerot 2008, 25). In particular, the distribution of individual economic reparations has been painfully slow. It only began in late 2011, under the new government of President Ollanta Humala, nearly twenty years after the capture of the Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, which led to the end of the war.

Yet another challenge has been growing social polarization in Peru around the issue of human rights. The years from 2008 to 2010 saw intensifying aggression against national human rights organizations. Peruvians themselves were divided over the final report of the Truth Commission, some feeling that it was fair whereas others felt that the
report's indictment of the military was unfair. Some likened Commission members to “terrorists” themselves. These tensions eventually came to a head in relation to two main issues: the construction of a Museum of Memory, and the international award garnered by a film about Peru’s civil conflict, La Teta Asustada (The Milk of Sorrow). The German government had offered Peru two million US dollars in aid to build a national Museum of Memory, dedicated to honoring the memory of the victims of Peru’s civil conflict. But in 2009, prominent members of the government, in particular the Minister of Defense Antero Flores Aráoz, criticized the museum project, saying the money would be better spent on aid to the poor. A polemical public debate ensued, in which supporters of the military expressed the fear that the museum would lack objectivity, would honor the subversives, and would tarnish the image of the military. Others, like the daughter of former President Fujimori, argued for a museum of “victory” honoring the military and not the victims. The project was only saved when renowned Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa persuaded President Garcia of its importance. The president approved the project and named Vargas Llosa president of the commission, with the mission of maintaining its objectivity. But Vargas Llosa resigned soon after in protest over a proposed law that would have allowed amnesty for officials prosecuted for violations of human rights. Although the law was not passed, Vargas Llosa refused to return to the post. The museum has now been built, but the debate highlighted the deep fissures among Peruvians left by the war.

At almost the same time, in 2009 Claudia Llosa, a young filmmaker, received the Berlin Golden Bear award and in 2010 an Oscar nomination for the film La Teta Asustada. This is the first movie to place an Andean subject at the center of attention; its protagonist is a young girl who experiences the pain of her mother, a Quechua speaker who had been raped during Peru’s internal war. “Milk of Sorrow” refers to a rare disease contracted by women who suffered violence in Peru’s war, and transmit the disease to their children through their breast milk. The disease is an allegory for the lingering effects of the war on subsequent generations. In one of her first interviews Claudia Llosa pointed out that in the film, she did not speak of blame, rather she tried to capture the pain of the women who suffered the barbarity of war and sexual violence and how this pain passes from generation to generation without due analysis. Furthermore, she said that everyone should find a way to heal without leaving their memory behind. It was the first Peruvian film nominated for an academy award for best foreign language film.

Despite these important challenges, there is a growing consciousness of rights among new generations of Peruvians in both the countryside and the cities, and there are growing numbers of organizations of those affected. These organizations are mobilizing and serving as interlocutors between the government and the population, and they are making proposals for change. For example, ANFASAP, the organization of women from Ayacucho mentioned previously, continues to press on, providing support to its members. In the postviolence era, between 2006 and 2007 various regional and local organizations founded the national Coordinating Committee of Populations Affected by Political Violence (Coordinadora Nacional de Poblaciones Afectadas por la Violencia Política, CONAVIP). CONAVIP was formed by families organized in the regions of Peru most affected by violence, and was led primarily by young people. The organization of CONAVIP has facilitated greater communication with the state during the reparations process. In addition to these organizations of families of victims, the Human Rights Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora de Derechos Humanos) and Citizens Movement for No Repetition (Movimiento Ciudadano “Para que no se Repita”) are networks that coordinate NGOs, human rights activists, and other interested civil society organizations. More recently, artists and university students have added to these efforts new strategies—such as street protests and internet campaigns, protesting, for example, the candidacy of former president Alberto Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko Fujimori, for president in 2011.

Conclusion

Peru’s internal war with the Shining Path opened the door to violations of human rights, terror, and militarization. The war was sparked by a fanatical ideologue who successfully organized an armed uprising. But the conditions of human insecurity that had existed in Peru prior to the conflict in many ways made this organizing possible and this ideology stick. Incredible poverty and high degrees of inequality and racism enabled this ideology to take hold, as young people saw no way
out except through violence. The war in the countryside continued unabated for so long in part because the white and mestizo residents of urban areas saw the conflict as a war among indigenous peoples, something apart from their own reality, which could be conveniently ignored. Ultimately, the fear and terror wielded by the Shining Path brought no opportunities for the excluded and marginalized those whom the movement purported to represent. If anything, it opened the way for President Alberto Fujimori and his followers to deploy new forms of coercion and intimidation in the countryside.

Today, while thousands of families still live in precarious conditions—conditions that are arguably more precarious psychologically and economically as a result of the conflict—sections of Peru's political elite continue to resist and defy the recommendations of the Final Report of the TRC. Human rights are not a priority, and the gravity of the conflict is still not fully recognized. This lack of recognition can be attributed in part to the fact that there never was a formal deposing of arms to mark the end of the conflict. But the larger reason is that the lives of those most affected by the violence, those of the communities in the highlands of Peru, continue to be looked at as distant and different by most Peruvians in the cities. This reality demands that Peruvians grapple with racism, which manifests itself in distinct forms against indigenous peoples of the Amazon, the Andes, and the indigenous and Afro-Peruvian residents of the cities.

While huge challenges remain, we can also point to some remarkably positive outcomes as a result of the work of the TRC, outcomes that we think can be attributed to its gendered approach to human security. Perhaps most importantly, the final report of the TRC integrated sexual violence and the gendered experience of violence, aspects that have been largely ignored by other truth commissions, bringing to light the gendered nature of Peru's war and atrocities like sexual violence that may not otherwise have been documented. In addition, perhaps inspired by the TRC's emphasis on the importance of symbolism and memory, local memorial initiatives have sprung up; municipalities, especially in Ayacucho and Huancavelica have erected monuments and places of remembrance. The women of ANFASAP even created a museum dedicated to memory in 2005. We have also seen the consolidation of human rights activist networks at local and

regional levels and the growth of a new generation of leaders among the populations affected by violence. The work of the TRC in bringing voice to the voiceless, while not perfect, has helped to foster a sense of empowerment among those affected by violence. It is also one small step in what must be a much larger project, that of overcoming the deep gendered, racial, and economic inequalities that exist in Peru today.

NOTES

1. While "ethnicity" is often the term used in Peru to differentiate among indigenous, mixed race (mestizo), and whites, we prefer the term race because race refers to dynamics of power based upon negative stereotypes, and thus more accurately describes these relations in Peru, whereas ethnicity refers only to cultural differences. See discussion in EWIG 2010, 13–16.

2. “Transformative” justice refers to processes of justice that not only transition a state and society out of conflict, but also seek to change preconflict structures so that they are more inclusive and fair, and takes into account broader issues such as state fragility (Lamborune 2009).

3. See also the September 2004 issue of Security Dialogue for a range of views on the concept.

4. On the significant correlation between social and economic inequality and race/ethnicity in Peru, see chapter 3 of Thorp and Paredes 2010.

5. For an insightful account of the early years of the Shining Path, see Gorriti 1999.


7. One of the authors, Narda Henriquez, worked for the Commission.

8. The Council on Reparations, which is in charge of registering individual victims of violence for the purpose of reparations, has found triple the number of sexual violence cases than the number found by the TRC.


10. In some instances war also brought a break with traditional gender roles, for example, a few women joined the mainly male self-defense militias formed to protect communities from the Shining Path. Following the conflict, however, many of these women were unable to maintain their newly gained authority.

REFERENCES


